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A NOTE ON THE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND
FOR LEGAL SERVICES•
Rodney H. Mabry

It has recently been suggested2 that lawyer associations
in the United States are using minimum fee schedules to fix
prices and raise profits. These "suggested, advisory or minimum" fee schedules set the fees which should be collected by
the lawyer for the usual services provided in particular kinds
of legal cases.
While it is undoubtedly true that the intent of these schedules is to raise the income of lawyers, it is less certain that
these tactics are successful for the industry as a whole. The
purpose of this note is to suggest theoretical reasons why the
legal profession may underestimate the true elasticity of demand for their services, leading to the development and enforcement of minimum fee schedules which may reduce total
legal income.
For the minimum fee schedules to meet their objective
of raising the total income of lawyers, the price of legal services must be raised above its market equilibrium and the
market demand curve must be relatively inelastic. With elastic demand, total legal income will fall as price is raised above
equilibrium.
The relevant question, then, is whether there is any reason to believe that the demand for legal services might be
elastic. An application of Leibenstein's bandwagon effect3
to the legal service market provides interesting support for
an affirmative answer.
Given prices, the demand for any product or service is
determined by its utility-satisfying characteristics. The utility of some commodities, however, is dependent not only on
inherent qualities in the commodity but also on the amount
of that commodity which is currently being consumed by
others. In Leibenstein's words-I, this bandwagon effect refers
"to the extent to which the demand for a commodity is increased due to the fact that others are also consuming the
same commodity."
Many legal services have the interesting characteristic
that they are subject to a bandwagon effect. To simplify the
analysis, suppose that all legal services may be dichotomized
into offensive and defensive categories. An increase in consumption of offensive legal services will certainly increase
the marginal utility of defensive legal services in both civil
and criminal litigation.
Thus, in new cases about to begin one might expect a onefor-one increase in the demand for defensive legal services.
For cases already in progress, the use of additional offensive
8

or defensive legal services (e. g. calling in a second prosecutor
or defense lawyer) will increase the opposition's demand for
legal services.
This phenomenon in the legal service market can easily
be shown with the aid of figure 1 which is adapted from Leibenstein5. The inelastic market demand curve, D 8 , is drawn
to reflect real preferences for legal services at various prices,
given that quantity Oa of legal services is being consumed
at prices OP1 .
If the pnce falls to OP2 the quantity of legal services demanded increases by the amount ax to quantity Ox based
solely on the income and substitution effects of the price
decline.
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Ox quantity demanded is not the prevailing quantity, however, because some consumers, who are not affected by the
price decline, now increase their demand in response to the
increased quantity of the legal services being consumed by
those adversaries affected by the drop in price.
Thus, the demand curve shifts rightward, becoming Db,
where Ob is the total quantity of legal services demanded at
the lower price. In other words, as the quantity demanded
of both offensive and defensive legal services rises due to a
price decrease, there is an autonomous increase in the demand
for legal services to the degree that new demand for opposing legal services is generated. Hence, only one point on
each of these demand curves will represent the actual quantity
demanded in the market and it will be determined by the
prevailing price.
The equilibrium points e1, e2, ..., eJ have been connected
to represent the effective demand curve, D•, that exists in
the legal services market. The elasticity of this effective demand curve is necessarily greater than that of the perceived
demand curve since the latter does not account for what may
be called the ratchet demand effect.
Whether or not the demand curve is actually elastic over
the relevant range is an empirical question and will depend
upon ( 1) the elasticity of the percei\•ed demand curve, and
(2) the magnitude of the ratchet demand effect associated
with initial changes in quantity demanded resulting from
price changes.
In the first case, the elasticity of perceived demand will
be strongly affected by the availabilitv of substitute goods
or services. The availability of substitutes for legal services
depends on the nature of the situation or event calling for
legal services. In the case of federal criminal action, for instance, the defendent is required to employ legal counsel,
but the amount and quality of legal service he in fact obtains
is quite open.
In "legal advice" situations involving tax law, property
and contract law, for example, many substitutes for legal
services exist in the form of full service banks, brokerage
firms, real estate brokers, certified public accountants, marriage counselors, and even public libraries containing information on how to make a will. Indeed, many legal services of
the past have evolved over time into regular business services, one dramatic example being the preparation of federal
and state tax returns.
An explanation of the persistent support by the legal
profession for minimum fee schedules may be that individual
lawyers consider only the direct decrease in quantity demanded which results from an increase in their own prices.
As individuals, they may justifiably conclude that the revenue

lost on forgone sales is exceeded by revenue gained on units
still sold.
Thus, by ignoring the negative external effects on the
demand for other lawyers' services, each lawyer may overestimate the value to himself of a general increase in the
price of legal services. Taking the ratchet demand effect into
account might very well lead to the removal of minimum fee
schedules in this profession.
In conclusion, we have attempted to explore the area of
legal services to the purpose of stimulating thought and research in a much neglected field. We have suggested that
there may be theoretical reasons to expect a much more
elastic demand for legal services than may be generally believed and that minmum fee schedules may reduce total legal
income. Specifically, more empirical work is needed to determine
(a) what the elasticity of the perceived demand curve
for various categories of legal services actually is,
(b) the nature and extent of the ratchet demand effect,
(c) the history of the legal profession with regard to
changes in the composition of output and the rise
of substitutes for legal services, and
(d) the direct effect of changes in minimum fee schedules in various states on the quatity of output and the
net income of lawyers.
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